Sunday, January 14, 2024

MARTIN BUBER AND GENUINE RELATIONSHIP

 Cassandra Paragua

Martin Buber (1878-1965)
Martin  Mordechai Buber was a prolific author, scholar, literary translator, and political activist whose writings—mostly in German and Hebrew—ranged from Jewish mysticism to social philosophy, biblical studies, religious phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, education, politics, and art. (Zank, M. & Braiterman, Z., 2014). He was a prominent twentieth-century philosopher, religious thinker, political activist, and educator. Born in Vienna, Austria on February 8, 1878, where he spent most of his life in Germany and Israel, writing in German and Hebrew. When he was three, his mother deserted him, and his paternal grandparents raised him in Lemberg until the age of fourteen, after which he moved to his father’s estate in Bukovina. Buber would only see his mother once more when he was in his early thirties. This encounter he described as a “mismeeting” that helped teach him the meaning of a genuine meeting. (Scott, S., 2014)

            He studied philosophy and art history at the University of Vienna, Leipzig, Berlin, and Zurich. (Cruz, 1995).  He is best known for his book, Ich und Du (I and Thou), which distinguishes between “I-Thou” and “I-It” modes of existence. Buber was often characterized as an existentialist philosopher, but he rejected the label, contrasting his emphasis on the whole person and “dialogic” intersubjectivity with existentialist emphasis on “monologic” self-consciousness. In his essays, he defines man as the being who faces an “other” and constructs a world from the dual acts of distancing and relating. (Scott, S., 2014) He is best known as "the philosopher of dialogue”. But he also was a gifted linguist and educational theorist. Indeed, he ranked among the most dedicated humanists and enlightened teachers of all time.  After he retired from Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Buber went on tours mostly in the U.S. and Europe lecturing and joining dialogues on philosophy, education, and psychotherapy. As an educator, Buber was tirelessly active for almost sixty years. He also enjoyed a sixty-year marriage, although he kept his personal life to himself. (Nguyen, 2014)

Buber was also the founder of Zoonism where he was the “respected and literate voice of German Jewry”. (Cruz, 1995).   Buber promoted Jewish cultural renewal through his study of Hasidic Judaism. He recorded and translated Hasidic legends and anecdotes, translated the Bible from Hebrew into German in collaboration with Franz Rosenzweig, and wrote numerous religious and Biblical studies. He advocated a bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state and argued for the renewal of society through decentralized, communitarian socialism. The leading Jewish adult education specialist in Germany in the 1930s, he developed a philosophy of education based on addressing the whole person through education of character. He directed the creation of Jewish education centers in Germany and teacher-training centers in Israel. (Scott, S., 2014)

There are certain philosophers who, in a way, influenced him to formulate his concept. He got his God-man relationship from Soren Kierkegaard, who said that the man who appropriates and affirms his relationship with God in faith becomes what he really is. (Buber, 1994). Belief is a relation of life to what is believed, a relation of life that includes all life. Martin Heidegger influenced Buber when he emphasized that man can attain his wholeness not by relating to himself but by relating to “another self.” This other self may be just as conditioned and limited as he is, yet in being together, the unlimited and the unconditioned are experienced. (Buber, 1947).

Ludwig Feuerbach, on the other hand, said that man is situated not in his individual self, but in his relationship towards others. This influenced Buber to focus on philosophical anthropology, which is for him, “the study of the wholeness of man.” (Wood, 1969) And he studied specifically the relation of man to his “Thou.”

Theory of Dialogue
The fundamental fact of human existence is men to men. Human existence is defined by how we engage in dialogue with each other, with the world, and with God. (Buber, 2000) The heart of Buber's philosophy might be considered to be in his conception of dialogue.  In an ordinary sense, dialogue is often thought to be a situation where two people talk to each other. For Buber (1965dialogue is a kind of movement—an essential action (i.e., the action of turning towards the other in his particularity, not necessarily in the physical sense, but rather in the spiritual (or in his response to the other). 

For Buber, it was important to understand the distinction between two different types of human existence “what one’s reality is” as opposed to “the image of what one wishes to be, for the main obstacle to dialogue is the duality of “being” (Sein) and “seeming” (Schein). Seeming is the essential cowardice of man, the lying that frequently occurs in self-presentation when one seeks to communicate an image and make a certain impression (Buber,1957). Buber (1965) distinguished three types of dialogue: genuine, technical, and disguised.
  
In genuine dialogue, whether it is spoken or silent, each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them to establish a living mutual relation between them. The essence of dialogue is "not that you are to answer but that you are able (Clark Winright, 1991)In the characteristic manner of true dialogue, the I does not demand or order that the other respond to him. Rather, the critical factor of the dialogic relation is that the other has achieved the "ability" to respond to or to answer the I. Inanimate objects are seen as "able" to sensibly affect and/or penetrate the awareness of human subjects. Once viewed by such a subject as a being, an object becomes capable of further response, and a dialogic relationship is established, even if no word is ever spoken.   Genuine dialogue, no matter whether spoken or silent where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present or particular being and turns to them intending to establish a living mutual relation between himself and them. (Buber,1965)
 Technical dialogue is a product of modern times. This dialogue is prompted "solely by the need for objective understanding. The purpose of this dialogue is the communication of technical particulars between two persons, necessary to achieve a working agreement or compromise. (Buber, 1965). For example, when an architect discusses the specifics of a blueprint with a construction worker to come to some sort of understanding about the building project, technical dialogue occurs. There are some similarities in the structure of genuine dialogue and technical dialogue, however, the purpose of technical dialogue is focused on the critical exchange of information rather than on establishing a spiritual relationship.
3Monologue disguised as dialogue, in which two men, meeting in space, speak each with themselves in strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the torment of being thrown back on their own resources. Monologue, as described by Buber (1965), also has a "basic movement". If turning toward the other is the basic movement of genuine dialogue, then one might assume "turning away" to be the basic movement of monologue.

The meeting involved in genuine dialogue is rare, and is, in a real sense, a meeting of souls. The life of dialogue involves “the turning towards the other” (Buber, 1965). Technical dialogue is driven by the need to understand something and need not engage the soul. Monologue, a distorted form of dialogue, is what happens most of the time. Words are stated, but there is little or no connection. This reflects Piaget’s (1995) notion of egocentric speech in which people find it cognitively difficult to keep in mind their own perspective, let alone another person’s view while they are talking. Instead, they rely on their own view. Hewes (1986) provided eloquent examples of egocentric speech at cocktail parties. Individuals tend to follow the basic conventions of dialogue including turn-taking and the use of trite acknowledgments of another person’s statements. Yet, the meaningful dialogue of a normal conversation is missing because collective monologues are used. Diminished cognitive capacity prevents people from integrating both halves of a conversation and they rely on their own half to demonstrate at a minimum, that they can articulate their own point of view well. Furthermore, Hewes (1986) noted that “It is difficult formulating your own thoughts while attempting to manage the flow of conversation with full consideration of the other’s contributions to it”.
Martin Buber’s most influential philosophic work, I-Thou (2000) designates two basic modes of existence: I-Thou” (Ich-Du) and “I-It” (Ich-Es)
1.      I–Thou is a relation of subject to subject.  In the I–Thou relationship, people are aware of each other as having a unity of being and you see yourself and others as whole persons who cannot be reduced to characterizations. In the I–Thou relationship, people do not perceive each other as consisting of specific, isolated qualities, but engage in a dialogue involving each other’s whole being. The “I-Thou” relation is the pure encounter of one whole unique entity with another in such a way that the other is known without being subsumed under a universal.  “I-Thou” relation participates in the dynamic, living process of an “other”. Man's dialogue brings him into the "between man and man,” but also into the "between man and God." For God is the Eternal Thou in whom "the extended lines of relation meet."  "Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the Eternal Thou; through every particular Thou, the primary word addresses the Eternal Thou." God is the center of the circle of existence, the apex of the triangle of life.
2.      I–It is a relation of subject to object. In the I–It relationship human beings perceive each other as consisting of specific, isolated qualities, and view themselves as part of a world that consists of things. In I–it relationships, you think of the other person as an object to be labeled, manipulated, changed, and maneuvered to your own belief. “I-It” relation is driven by categories of “same” and “different” and focuses on universal definition. An “I-It” relation experiences a detached thing, fixed in space and time.  

Buber (1965) characterizes “I-Thou” relations as “dialogical” and “I-It” relations as
monological.” In his essay “Dialogue,” Buber explains that monologue is not just a turning away from the other but also a turning back on oneself (Rückbiegung). To perceive the other as an It is to take them as a classified and hence predictable and manipulable object that exists only as a part of one’s own experiences. In contrast, in an “I-Thou” relation both participants exist as polarities of relation, whose center lies in the between (Zwischen). The “I” of man differs in both modes of existence. The “I” may be taken as the sum of its inherent attributes and acts, or it may be taken as a unitary, whole, irreducible being. The “I” of the “I-It” relation is a self-enclosed, solitary individual (der Einzige) that takes itself as the subject of experience. The “I” of the “I-Thou” relation is a whole, focused, single person (der Einzelne) that knows itself as the subject. In I - Thou, Buber explains that the self becomes either more fragmentary or more unified through its relationships with others. This emphasis on intersubjectivity is the main difference between I-Thou and Buber’s earlier Daniel: Dialogues on Realization (1965). Like I-Thou, Daniel distinguishes between two modes of existence: orienting (Rientierung), which is a scientific grasp of the world that links experiences, and realization (Verwirklichung), which is immersion in experience that leads to a state of wholeness. 

Buber identifies three spheres of dialogue that correspond to three types of otherness. We exchange in language, broadly conceived, with man, transmit below language with nature, and receive above language with spirit. That we enter into dialogue with man is easily seen; that we also enter into dialogue with nature and spirit is less obvious and the most controversial and misunderstood aspect of I-Thou. However, if we focus on the “I-Thou” relationship as a meeting of singularities, we can see that if we truly enter into relation with a tree or cat, for instance, we apprehend it not as a thing with certain attributes, presenting itself as a concept to be dissected, but as a singular being, one whole confronting another. Dialogue with spirit is the most difficult to explicate because Buber uses several different images for it. At times he describes dialogue with spirit as a dialogue with the “eternal Thou,” which he sometimes calls God, which is eternally “other”. (Scott, S., 2014)

Buber (2000) summarizes the trappings of I-Thou and I-It in this way:
Every Thou in the world is doomed by its nature to become a thing or at least to enter into thinghood again and again. In the language of objects: everything in the world can—either before or after it becomes a thing appear to some I as its Thou. But the language of objects catches only one corner of actual life.

Buber (2000) continues: “The It is the chrysalis, the Thou the butterfly. Only it is not always as if these states took turns so neatly; often it is an intricately entangled series of events that is tortuously dual”.  Because life is necessarily lived in a world of persons and things, every waking moment of man's life he confronts and/or is confronted by those aspects of reality. He is bombarded by sensory information demanding his attention. With those persons and/or things which he can single out and focus upon, bestowing his full and undivided attention, he establishes genuine relations. In reaching out toward the inanimate other as Thou rather than It, Buber (1965) says: ”...when a man draws a lifeless thing into his passionate longing for dialogue, lending it independence and as It were a soul, then there may dawn in him the presentiment of a world-wide dialogue”.

Man attains being, Buber posits, only through transcendence of the attitudes and arguments of subjectivism (i.e., perceiving the existence of objective reality as a construct of mind) and objectivism (I.e., perceiving the existence of objective reality as independent of mind.  For Buber, the transcendence of these irreconcilable differences and/or limitations can be found exclusively within the context of the between. That is to say, the between (as a way of knowing reality) exists apart from either view as it represents the point at which man attains being or true existence (Wood, 1969). However, unless man consciously confronts the other in his particularity, the meeting cannot take place, subsequently, where there is no genuine meeting, there can be no dialogue, no between, and therefore, no transcendence of the arguments of subjectivism and/or objectivism.

Model of Genuine Relationship
All real living is meeting (Buber, 1965). For Buber encounter has a significance beyond co-presence and individual growth. He looked for ways in which people could engage with each other fully – to meet with themselves. Persons and/or things are seen to exist only about other things and/or persons. We can only grow and develop once we have learned to live in relation to others, and to recognize the possibilities of the space between us. In common terminology, the word, "relation," suggests a state of affairs which in some way connects two separate entities. (Clark Winright, 1991). The very essence of any existence is this connecting state of relation, which he calls the between (Friedman, 2002.). As Aubrey Hodes (1971) puts it:
When a human being turns to another as another, as a particular and specific person to be addressed, and tries to communicate with him through language or silence, something takes place between them that is not found elsewhere in nature. Buber called this meeting between men the sphere of the between.
Relation, as an event or action, occurs between two entities—between a person, whose attention is completely turned toward someone or something other than himself, and another person or thing who/which confronts him in the same spirit. Buber (2000) posits: “In the beginning is the relation—as the category of being, as readiness, as a form that reaches out to be filled, as a model of the soul; the a priori of relation”.

When Buber speaks of relation, he refers to man's and nature's innate potential to relate. That is, each man and each thing of nature possess unique characteristics that set them apart from other persons and things. It is this uniqueness that endows man and/or thing with the potential to enter into relation. At the point in time when this confrontation of the other occurs, man enters into relation and thus comes to exist or to be. "It is solely by his power to relate that man can live in the spirit" (Buber, 2000). Spirit, or world transcendence occurs only in the between of man's relation to the other person or thing. This is not to suggest that spirit is some magical, mystical, elevated state of existence in which man, beyond and outside of himself, knowingly escapes or separates himself from the woes of a less fortunate world.  While in the spirit of relation, according to Buber, it would be more accurate to say that man is most genuinely himself. Accordingly, Buber would hold that man's participation in spirit enlarges and/or delimits his existence to the point of wholeness. Thus, spirit does not set man apart from his physical environment in the manner of an ascetic, rather, it creates a bond between the two--a dialogic bond leading to mutuality of purpose and concerted action. Man is born with the potential to relate to other persons and things, but he ceases to genuinely exist in spirit apart from the actualization of that potential, even though he may be physically alive. (Clark Winright, 1991)
A relationship exists in the form of dialogue. There are two kinds of relationships according to Buber: the I-It and the I-Thou relationships. The I-It relationship is simply a monologue. The “I” treats the other as an object, thus resulting in manipulation and utility. The I-Thou relationship is what Buber calls the “genuine dialogue,” (Nguyen, 2014)
Authentic human existence the dialogic life is existence in the I-ThouThe intrinsic value of dialogue lies in its ability to create, uncover, explore, and develop meaning; to manifest an I-Thou relationship that reveals and affirms self and other; and to serve as a way of being in and with the world. (Fishbane, 1998)
Buber, in what is considered his most significant work, I-Thou, first published in 1923, considers there to be only one genuine relation--that of the I-Thou (subject and subject).  Relationships between an I turned toward a certain other (Thou) are characterized as brief, but intense meetings or encounters, grounded in mutual respect and appreciation and most often resulting in genuine dialogue (Friedman, 2002).  In this genuine dialogue, a person is not only conversing with the other but affirming him as a person. Such true dialogue is an act of mutual affirmation. It involves the value of trust and openness to each other (Nguyen, 2014). Buber (2002) emphasizes genuine dialogues where presence is felt and there is “speech from certainty to certainty.” He also emphasizes that dialogue includes communication from “one open-hearted person to another open-hearted person”. Only then, in a spirit of openness, will dialogue manifest itself. Buber further clarified that even in the absence of words, the mere presence of the other marks an expression of affirmation, and it uplifts one’s self-esteem and self-reliance.

I thou relationship is a relationship characterized by genuine dialogue. In the analysis of Vu Nguyen (2014), the I-Thou relationship is a kind of relationship that covers as much as human relationships are concerned. It deals with the relation of man to things, to another man, and to the spirit. Being, as subject, is being experienced from within, not according to its object surface, but in itself as unique subsistent, as original center and source of free initiative. It is in which the “I” relates with a subject, same as he, only with a certain peculiarity, in which all actual determination presents itself as a sort of inexhaustible source. 

In the study of Elaine Clark Winright, entitled Martin Buber's I and Thou as a model for the relationship between artist and visual artwork stated that the I Thou refers to a relation occurring between subject and subject. To become the I of the I-Thou, man must, in a special sense, turn his attention outward toward some other (i.e., something apart from and other than himself), rather than inward toward himself. This turning outward is described by Buber as a sort of opening of oneself before approaching the other as Thou. Buber describes this event: The relation to the Thou is unmediated purpose intervenes between I and Thou, no greed and no anticipation. For this opening of self or turning outward to occur, man must first be aware of his own uniqueness those qualities which he possesses that set him distinctly apart from others. When this occurs, he begins to perceive the world of reality in terms of othernessMan becomes increasingly aware of his own uniqueness as he focuses upon the unique characteristics of some other aspect of his environment or other.
In I-Thou man becomes whole not in relation to himself but only through a relation to another self. The formation of the “I” of the “I-Thou” relation takes place in a dialogical relationship in which each partner is both active and passive and each is affirmed as a whole being. Only in this relationship is the other truly an “other”, and only in this encounter can the “I” develop as a whole being. Buber (2000) maintains that in becoming the I of I-Thou, man cannot hold anything of himself back, he must confront the Thou with his "whole being." Withholding some aspect of self or placing it in reserve, destroys the opening or turning outward process. In that, it derives from and signals the presence of some interfering purpose or intent. As the I of I-Thou turns toward the other as that which is apart and distinct from itself, a point of meeting occurs. Meeting refers to the event of becoming I and Thou, or the point at which the two relate. Buber often uses the word, encounter, as the synonym of meeting. When the two encounter each other in their particularity, the resulting mutuality of purpose lays the necessary groundwork for a genuine or authentic dialogue to occur between the two. One of the themes that Buber vigorously pursues in his thinking is the concept of separateness where there is, at the same time, unity. The I-Thou does not represent a complete merger—in that, each of the partners retains his separate and unique identity as a being or an existent, even as he willingly puts aside his autonomy of purpose for the sake of the relationship. For the partner that comes from the world of things (i.e., the environment), this means, for example, that the beauty of a rock confronts a man who attends to it as his Thou; the man may pick up the rock and admire It more closely, however, the rock retains its "rock-ness" and the man retains his "personhood." At the same time, the two have entered into a dialogue and have achieved a common or mutual purpose(Clark Winright, 1991).
In Love, as a relation between I-Thou is a subject-to-subject relation. Like the I- Thou love is not a relation of subject to object but rather a relation in which both members in the relationship are subjects and share a unity of being. Love is a relationship in which I-Thou share a sense of caring, respect, commitment, and responsibility. (Buber, 2002) 

The I-Thou relationship is not only a relationship between man to man but also a relationship between man to God. The ethical response of the I-Thou relationship is central to Buber’s understanding of God. One of the major themes of the book I – Thou, is that human life finds its meaningfulness in relationships. All relationships Buber contends, bring one ultimately into a relationship with Eternal Thou.  For Buber, God is the “Eternal Thou.” God is the only Thou which can never become an It. In other words, while relationships with other people will inevitably have utilitarian elements, in a genuine relationship with God, God cannot be used as a means toward an end.

In addition, according to Buber, our relationship with God serves as the foundation for our I-Thou relationships with all others, and every I-Thou relationship–be it with a person or thing–involves a meeting with God. God, in a sense, is the unifying context, the meeting place, for all meaningful human experience. According to Buber, one encounters God through one’s encounters with other human beings and the world. “Meet the world with the fullness of your being and you shall meet God.”
When one encounters the world in this way, revelation occurs. “God speaks to man in the things and beings he sends him in life,” Buber wrote. “Man answers through his dealings with these things and beings.” (Septimus & Beit-Halachmi, 2015)

Conclusion
Human existence is defined by the way we engage in dialogue with each other, with the world, and with God.  The development and nurturance of genuine dialogical relationships are central to Buber's philosophy—those occurring between human beings, those occurring between humans and other entities, and most importantly, those occurring between individual humans and God.  
A genuine relationship is only attained through genuine dialogue. Genuine dialogue becomes the revelation of the sacred in the sphere of the between, in the meeting of I and Thou. Buber begins I and Thou, with a reference to what he calls "the twofold nature of man's world," which, he says, is in harmony with man's "twofold attitude". Man knows and can address the world of persons and things in two ways, as subjects and as objects. As a result of the twofold nature of the world, Buber maintains, there are only two basic or primary words that can be spoken. These two basic words are actually two-word pairs: I-Thou and I-It. These word pairs are basic in the sense that every utterance of man necessarily revolves around one or the other of the concepts to which they refer. For I-It relationships, the “It” refers to entities as discrete objects defined set. Unfortunately, we frequently view people as an object. Rather than truly making ourselves completely available to them, understanding them, sharing totally with them, really talking with them, we observe them or keep them apart of ourselves outside the moment of the relationship. We do so either to protect our vulnerabilities to get them to respond in some preconceived way or to get something from them. We perceive the others to be an extension or likeness of himself. We sometimes miss the uniqueness of the other and instead, focus only on the qualities we identify as being most like their own. Viewing a relationship as security is another way of using others for selfish reasons. The man who attempts to relate to providing himself with security or to have the other depend upon him deactualizes his partner and thwarts all development of the between. I- Thou on the other hand is a relationship where we place ourselves completely into a relationship to truly understand and "be there" with another person, without masks, pretenses, even without words. Each person comes to such a relationship without preconditions. The bond thus created enlarges each person, and each person responds by trying to enhance the other person. 

Such I-Thou relationships are not constant or static. People move in and out of I-It moments to I-Thou moments. Ironically, attempts to achieve an I-Thou moment will fail because the process of trying to create an I-Thou relationship objectifies it and makes it an I-It. Even describing the moment objectifies it and makes it an I-It. The most Buber can do in describing this process is to encourage us to be available to the possibility of I-Thou moments, to achieve real dialogue. It can't be described. When you have it, you know it. Buber maintains that it is possible to have an I-Thou relationship with the world and the objects in it as well

Buber then moves from this existential description of personal relating to the religious experience. For Buber, God is the Eternal Thou. . God is the Thou who sustains the I-Thou relation eternally. In the I-Thou relation between the individual and God, there is a unity of being in which the individual can always find God. In the I-Thou relation, there is no barrier of other relations that separate the individual from God, and thus the individual can speak directly to God. Buber contends that the I-Thou relation between the individual and God is a universal relation that is the foundation for all other relations. If the individual has a real I-Thou relation with God, then the individual must have a real I-Thou relation with the world. If the individual has a real I-Thou relationship.
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Buber, M. (1957). Pointing the way: Collected essays. New York: Harper & Row.
Buber, M. (1965). Daniel: Dialogues on realization. (M. Friedman, Trans.) New York: McGraw-Hill.
Buber, M. (1994). Between man and man. (F. Coplestone, Trans.) Glasgow: William Collines and Son.
Buber, M. (2000). Martin Buber, I and Thou. (R. G. Smith, Trans.) Retrieved March 15, 2017, from angelfire.com: http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewrap/buber.html
Buber, M. (2002). Between man and man. (R. G. Smith, Trans.) New York: Routledge.
Clark Winright, E. (1991). Martin Buber's I and Thou as a model for the relationship between artist and visual artwork.
Cruz, C. (1995). Philosophy of Man (Third Edition Ed.). San Juan, Metro Manila: MG Reprographics.
Fishbane, M. D. (1998). I, thou and we: A dialogical approach to couples therapy. Journal of   
Marital and Family Therapy.

Friedman, M. (2002). Introduction in m.buber, between man and man. London; Routledge.

Hewes, D. E. (1986). A socio-egocentric model of group decision-making. 

Hodes, A. (1971). Encounter with Martin Buber.

Nguyen, V. (2014, April 4). Martins Buber Educational Theory. Retrieved from New Foundations: www.newfoundations.co

Piaget, J. (1995). The child's construction of reality. New York: Meridian Books.

Scott, S. (2014). Martin Buber(1878-1965). Retrieved from The New School for Social Research
Septimus, D., & Beit-Halachmi, R. S. (2015). Martin Buber: The creation of a Jewish existentialism and a Jewish state. My Jewish Learning.

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Sunday, August 4, 2019

CRITICISM ON THE PHILOSPHICAL WORK OF VLADIMIR LENIN



 MARIA DOHNA D. SAGUN
Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (22 April 1870 – 21 January 1924), better known by the alias Lenin, was a Russian revolutionary, politician, and political theorist. Born to a moderately prosperous middle-class family in Simbirsk, Lenin embraced revolutionary socialist politics following his brother’s 1887 execution.   
            Lenin was the first leader of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and the government that took over Russia in 1917. He served as head of government of Soviet Russia from 1917 to 1924 and of the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1924.
            Lenin founded the Russian Communist Party, led the Bolshevik Revolution and was the architect of the Soviet state. He was the posthumous source of “Leninism”. These ideas include Democratic Centralism, also known as the idea of the vanguard party. Like other Communists, Lenin wanted to see a Socialist revolutionary led by the working class.
            It is not surprising to know that there were several philosophers who disagreed with the ideas of Lenin and as per studying said philosophies and ideas of Lenin I, too have disagreements on some of his ideas. 
            According to Vladimir Lenin natural scientists are dialectical materialists which mean that his philosophy encompasses a variety of perspectives. It is not committed to a specific political platform; hence his philosophies might be borrowed or patterned from other philosophers. Lenin is indeed pre-eminently a practitioner not a theorist of revolution. In general, Lenin mostly adapted Marx to the conditions of Russian Empire or extended his theory. He just used the works of other Marxists (like Kautsky) for his doctrine.
I also disagree with his idea that science and philosophy are unrelated. Lenin believes that a genuine philosophy should base its propositions not upon metaphysical speculation, but upon the latest findings in the natural sciences. However, he argues that even the natural sciences are fallible, and by then stressing the dependency of dialectical materialism upon findings in the natural sciences. He undermines the strategy of proclaiming absolute truths in the sphere of philosophy by appealing to such truths in the natural sciences. His emphasis upon the inseparability of natural science and philosophy therefore reinforces his opposition to dogmatism.    
            I also criticize his belief on monopolies of trade and industry as it eliminates the small industry replacing large scale industry by still larger-scale industry. According to him monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system; however the result of it was the decline of national economic competition. Monopoly is exactly the opposite of free competition which is not a good economic idea or practice.
            I also find the Leninist model in achieving revolution as elitist, hierarchical and highly inefficient in achieving a socialist society. This model plays a harmful role in class struggle by alienating activists and militants with their organizational principles and manipulative tactics within popular structures and groups. This can seize power and create a new form of class society in which working class is oppressed by new bosses.
            I agree with Edmund Wilson that the theoretical side of Lenin is, in a sense, not serious, it is in the instinct for dealing with the reality of the definite political situation that attains in him the point of genius. Lenin sees and adopts his tactics with no regard for the theoretical positions of others or for his own theoretical position in the past then he supports it with Marxists text.  
            As I further read his works/philosophies I believe Lenin possesses an outstanding mind but it is a mind of a single dimension. His sensibility enabled him to gamble and dispense with the lives of others, to feel no compunction about reversing promises and positions when expediency (the survival of the Bolshevik regime) demanded it.                                                                                    
References:

S. Page, Lenin and World Revolution (New York McGraw Hill Book Co., 1959)
E. Wilson, To the Finland Station (London 1960) (First Published 1940) 
Lenin (1917). The State and Revolution

External links:

Anti-communism
Leninism


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Tuesday, September 25, 2018

A REFLECTION ON THE PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP


By Fides Bernardo A. Bitanga
Introduction

            The paper contains a reflection on a very important issue in Ethics today, particularly in the field of Medical Ethics. This is the patient-physician relationship. It deals with the question – what should be the ideal patient-physician relationship or physician-patient relationship?
            This issue is difficult since the interaction between a physician and a patient is complicated by some factors. These factors could be (1) the influential (individual) authority and expertise of the physician influencing patient’s condition and decision, (2) the patient’s (personal) response as influence by his or her own beliefs, interests and values, (3) the degree of competence and specialization of the physician (with the full force of the medical services of the hospital) affecting decisions on health care managed care, and (4) patient’s differing disposition and level of understanding (as influenced and dictated upon by the community and culture). All these factors subject people’s ethical capacity to the test.
            In this paper, the student wishes to stress also some points. These are the value of the responsive character of ethics, the concept of human act (intellect and will), the concept of law, and the concepts of reason and impartiality. It is hoped that with the review of these concepts the ethical issue underlying the patient-physician relationship is clarified.

Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relationship
In the article “The Patient-Physician Relationship”[1], Ezekiel and Linda Emmanuel suggested that there could be four (4) models of the patient-physician relationship. These are the paternalistic model, the informative model, interpretative model, and the deliberative model. All these models would show different degrees of physician-patient interaction, obligations, values, and autonomy.
The Paternalistic Model is also called the paternal or priestly model. In this model, the interaction between the physician and the patient is to ensure that patients get the interventions that best promote their health and well-being. The physician uses his or her skills to diagnose the condition of the patient, and then presents his or her findings (with selected information) to the patient in order to get the latter’s consent. At the extreme, the physician AUTHORITATIVELY informs the patient when the intervention will be initiated. In other words, the physician acts as the patient’s guardian, articulating and implementing what is best for the patient.
The Informative Model is also called the scientific, engineering, or consumer model. In this model, the physician-patient interaction aims for the physician to give the patient with all relevant information for the patient to select the medical interventions he or she wants, and for the physician to do the selected health care service. The patient is told about the state of his or her sickness, the nature of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, the nature and probability of risks and benefits, and any uncertainty. In other words, it is the physician’s obligation to provide all available facts, and the patient’s values then determine what treatments are to be given.
The Interpretative Model embraces the aim of patient-physician interaction as something that elucidates the patient’s values and what he or she actually wants, and to help the patient select the available medical care that realize these values. In this model, the physician becomes an interpreting individual assisting the patient in elucidating and articulating his or her values and in determining what medical interventions best realize the specified values, and therefore helping to interpret the patient’s values for the patient. In short, the physician is a counsellor supplying relevant information, helping in elucidating values and suggesting what medical care would realize the values of the patient.
The last model is the Deliberative Model. In this model, the aim of patient-physician interaction is to help the patient determine and choose the best health-related values that can be realized in the clinical situation. In other words, this model embraces the features of the other models. What makes it unique from the other three is the fact that there is discussion and deliberation of diagnosis, treatment, alternatives, availability of resources and health care services, values, and many more. This model values the importance of dialogue leading to the best course of action.
What should be the ideal model for physician-patient relationship?

The Responsive Character of Ethics
            In attempting to come up with the best model, it is important to have a clear idea of responsibility. What is Responsibility?
In talking about the responsive character of ethics, the topic does not only refer to the ability to respond and react to certain circumstances. This character is not only the vigilance to moral dilemmas. It does not only refer to its operations, as to whether it is a faculty (the power to act in anticipation/prevention) or a judgment (the power to evaluate and judge). It rather speaks more of responsibility.
            Ethics is difficult to explain in isolation from the concept of responsibility or responsible freedom.[2] These two words are linked to one another. One understands ethics if one knows what responsibility is, and the understanding of responsibility leads to realization of the necessity of an ethical life.
What is responsibility? The word ‘responsibility’ is always a point in the long history of ethical debates. These debates, however, did not help in the clarification of its meaning. It rather contributed to its vagueness.[3] In an attempt for a clear and clean definition, Jean Paul Sartre said that responsibility is “the consciousness of being the incontestable author of an event or of an object.”[4] Connecting this definition by Sartre to the models presented by the Emmanuels, the “responsible” physician appears to be authoritarian in the practice of medical care. This may be good for the first model – the paternalistic model. In here, an action is responsible if it is not the result of any force or compulsion, but of the deliberate and free decision of a person. But if this definition is good enough, why people could not just forgive the acts and decisions of tyrants, authoritarians, and dictators? There must be something wrong in it, or may be something in it to be completed.
In the literal sense of the word ‘responsibility’, it carries the idea that it points to someone or somebody liable to give an answer for what one has done.[5] The word shows that one has to give an answer, and one has to give an answer to someone or somebody. To whom or to which authority a person is responsible?
This is the question that lingers in all the four models above. For the paternalistic model, Is the physician responsible to himself alone? In the informative model, is the physician responsible to the patient alone? Furthermore, is this responsibility a shared responsibility between the patient and the physician as in the case of the interpretative model and deliberative model? If it is shared, then to whom they are responsible?
A responsible person (physician, patient, and other stakeholders in the field of medical care) then is the person who gives appropriate answer to his or her calling by God, institution, authority, or society.[6]

The Concept of Human Act
            In attempting to come up with the best model for patient-physician relationship and perhaps in consideration of the informed consent, one has to have a good grasp of the nature of human acts. What are human acts?
            Human acts or actus humani are actions that proceed from insight into the nature and purpose of one’s doing and from consent of free will. Or, to put it short, these are acts which proceed from insight and free will.[7] This is the concept that clarifies all the roles of the physician, patient, and other stakeholders in the medical field. Following the dynamics of the intellectual element and the volitive element of human acts, one comes to understand the performances of each and every individual involved in the patient-physician relationship.
            The realization that the human intellect and the human will is not perfect the more one has to be careful in arriving at decisions, most especially when it comes to medical care and life-situations. There is such thing as impairments of required knowledge.[8] The human intellect could be impaired by ignorance, error, and inattention. There is also such a thing as impairments of free consent.[9] The will could be impaired by passion or concupiscence, fear and social pressure, violence, and dispositions and habits.

The Concept of Law
            The concept of law is also important in attempting to come up with the best model for patient-physician relationship. In the informative, interpretative and deliberative models, one should not ignore the laws. Laws are to be part in the information given to patients, these are to be interpreted, and these are to be discussed with the patients. This emphasis on the significance of laws is not to insinuate that one has to be legalistic. The awareness of laws in the medical field brings in the idea of bureaucracy, protocols, order, and guidance. It brings into light the communal aspect of ethical exercise.
Laws are fair and objective since these are ordinances of reason; these are reasonable. Laws are promulgated so that no one is deceived; these are made public. Laws are from authorities who have care for the community, and therefore these are not to serve tyrants and dictators. And laws are for the common good, the well-being of the people.[10]
With laws, physicians could not just do what they wish to do on their patients; patients cannot just select the interventions they needed, management could not just railroad every decisions in health care, and etc. Laws are legislated to control, to guide, to discipline, and above all to allow the exercise of freedom and responsibility.

Reason and Impartiality
            The last point in this reflection is something fundamental in ethical considerations. Basic in facing every ethical issue is the person’s reason and impartiality. In dealing with the physician-patient relationship, the moral judgments (as well as moral/ethical decisions) must be backed up by good reasons, and these also require the impartial consideration of each individual’s interests.[11]
            Giving importance to moral reasoning is prioritizing the search for the truth, the good, and even perhaps the beautiful. This is to arrive at a certain degree of unity, whether this unity is a unity in decision or unity to make the community stronger in the face of issues or moral dilemmas. It is setting aside the enticing influences of feelings and emotions.[12] For example, in health cases, feelings toward the sick and the dying are so enticing in the valuing and preservation of life even when there is no more reason to prolong a fully gadget-dependent life; these are so powerful influences in moral decisions. But feelings could present also danger in decision-making and the achievement of the truth and the good. This is so not only because feelings are irrational yet they may be nothing but the products of prejudice, selfishness, or cultural conditioning.
            Ethics is first and foremost of consulting reason. In the four models, the consulting of reason is seen more in the informative, interpretative, but most of all, in the deliberative. In the deliberative model, there are exchanges of explanations and reasoning with the hope of a unified moral reasoning for the best course of action. There is an attempt for a certain logic that must be accepted by everyone regardless of their positions in every moral issue.[13] Furthermore, moral reasoning or judgments are not expressions of personal tastes. These are sound logic – a good reasoning.
            What is a good reasoning? It is getting one’s facts straight.[14] And the facts needed are those existing independently from personal wishes. This is not easy but it is a requirement. In responsible moral thinking, these facts are to be seen as they are.
            After getting the facts, a careful insertion of moral principles can now be brought into play. In this way, moral principles are applied to the facts of particular cases. This is also the phase one could analysed the facts against moral theories and frameworks, like: Kantian Ethics, Utilitarianism, Virtue Ethics, and others. This procedure is also not easy. A very great responsibility is place in philosophizing or in thinking. This is because the moral agents, most especially stakeholders in health care, could not be wrong nor could be allowed to be wrong.
            Impartiality, out of good reasoning, includes the basic idea that each individual’s interests are equally important. There is no privileged idea, entity, nor person. Therefore, each stakeholder in health care must acknowledge that their welfare is as valuable as other’s welfare.
            Impartiality rejects the idea of selfishness, bias, racism, discrimination, and among others. It is a rule against arbitrariness in dealing with people.[15] In many hospitals, there are so many stories on medical decisions made because of color or race, poverty, ignorance, dishonesty (by hiding some available hospital resources and services in the name of personnel and hospital management), not being transparent (selecting only few information for the patients about their conditions), and others.
            In other words, it is a rule that forbids people from treating one person differently from another when there is no good reason to do so.

Conclusion
            One may insist that the four models of the physician-patient relationship (paternalistic, informative, interpretative, and deliberative) are all good and can still be operative in case to case basis. But seeing the four models in the light of some moral principles (laws, human acts, responsibility, reason and impartiality), one perhaps could prefer the Deliberative Model. This model is far from perfect, but its dialogic character creates more space for other stakeholders or moral agents in the decision-making. It also allows moral principles to be more at work. It therefore guarantees the better course of action as compared to the other three models.
SOURCES
Emmanuel, Ezekiel & Linda Emmanuel, “The Patient-Physician Relationship” in JAMA, Vol. 267,
 2221-2226.

Peschke, Karl H., Christian Ethics (Manila: Catholic Trade, 1986).
Rachel, James, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1984).
Sartre, Jean Paul, Being and Nothingness (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1969).


[1] Ezekiel & Linda Emmanuel, “The Patient-Physician Relationship” in JAMA, Vol. 267, 2221-2226.  Both authors are Medical Doctors and Doctors of Philosophy.
[2] Karl H. Peschke, Christian Ethics (Manila: Catholic Trade, 1986), 66.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1969), 32.
[5] Peschke.
[6] Ibid, 67.
[7] Ibid, 247.
[8] Ibid, 252.
[9] Ibid, 255.
[10] Ibid, 176-186.
[11] James Rachel, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1984), 11.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid, 12-13.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid, 14.

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Hannah Arendt on the Wordlessness and Crimes against Humanity

  Yosef Keladu University of St. Thomas, Manila, Philippines Abstract: This paper attempts to investigate Arendt’s idea that crimes against ...